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US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks?
KENT R. MEYER

From Parameters, Winter 2000-01, pp. 67-82.

The questions of whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be enlarged and, if so, to what
degree have been among the most difficult and sensitive issues facing the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. In
shaping the US National Security Strategy regarding US interests in Europe and US NATO policy, President Clinton
has declared his support for NATO membership for well-qualified democracies regardless of geography or history,
including those in northeastern Europe.
US policy regarding NATO enlargement should seek to strengthen the Alliance as well as to bolster democratic
advances, deter potential threats, and increase regional stability throughout Europe. However, by promoting a policy
that supports NATO membership for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Administration is
jeopardizing vital US national interests and undermining NATO's collective defense mission.[1] This article examines
US strategy regarding NATO enlargement, assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and recommends changes to protect
vital US interests in Europe while providing the Baltic republics with a security alternative to NATO membership.
NATO's Strategic Concept and Enlargement
Beginning in 1989, unexpectedly rapid political, military, and social changes resulted in the end of the ideological and
military stalemate in Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Those changes and the regional instability caused by
ethnic and religious conflict occurring within Europe prompted NATO to examine and adjust its policies, missions,
and structures. NATO's new strategic concept, approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, reflects the new
security challenges and dangers extant in Europe. It also reflects the Alliance's increased commitment to coordinate
and cooperate with other international institutions in supporting "out of area" operations (those conducted outside the
territory of NATO member states).[2] However, despite NATO's increasing involvement in nontraditional operations,
the Alliance's essential and enduring mission is to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence, and
security of its members.[3] It is that mission that has resulted in a flood of Central and Eastern European applicants
seeking NATO membership.
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty provides that "the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."[4] This commitment was reaffirmed by NATO leaders during the 1994 Brussels
Summit, where they declared that membership in the Alliance remained open to those nations who could further the
principles established in the Washington Treaty.[5] The strategic goals served by enlargement and the methods used to
achieve enlargement were examined the following year. The product of that examination was the "Study on NATO
Enlargement," wherein the Alliance's principles for accessing new members were documented.
The study concluded that the enlargement of the Alliance contributes to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic
area. It also addressed the selection and accession of new members and confirmed that accession would occur in
accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, with new members receiving all the rights of
Treaty membership.[6] However, when addressing the rights of new members, the study also designated their
obligations by declaring that new members must be prepared to contribute to NATO's budget and support the
Alliance's evolving missions and its fundamental collective defense role.[7] To ensure that new members are able to
contribute to NATO's collective defense as well as benefit from it, the study states that before accessing new members,
the Alliance will evaluate the effects of their admission to ensure that enlargement will not diminish NATO's military
credibility.[8]

In addition to delineating NATO's military expectations for new members, the study established political guidelines for
membership. To be considered for accession, prospective members must have established democratic and civilian
control of their military forces, and they must have resolved ethnic or external territorial disputes. They also must
demonstrate a commitment to the basic principles of democracy, to individual liberty and the rule of law, and to
adequate funding to fulfill the obligations incurred by Alliance membership.[9]
US Policy Regarding NATO Enlargement
Before the US Senate's 1998 vote on the admission of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, President Clinton
declared,
Let me be very clear: NATO's core mission will remain the same--the defense of the territory of its
members. The addition of new members will strengthen and enhance that mission. In pursuing
enlargement, we have made sure not to alter NATO's core function or its ability to defend America and
Europe's security.[10]
But is the defense of Euro-American security the goal sought by the United States in supporting NATO enlargement,
and does Baltic republic membership in NATO help achieve that end? The answer to both questions seems to be no. If
the objective of additional NATO enlargement is to enhance the Alliance's mission to defend the territory of its
members against Russia, then additional enlargement is unnecessary. NATO already possesses sufficient strategic
depth.[11] The contradiction between the reasons for NATO enlargement detailed by President Clinton's comments
and those contained in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) is apparent. It reveals that the maintenance of NATO's
traditional defense mission is not the primary objective sought by the Clinton Administration in promoting the
Alliance's continued expansion.
Acknowledging that NATO is the anchor of American engagement in Europe, the NSS states that the Alliance is
instrumental in helping to "build" an integrated, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Europe.[12] By emphasizing the
Alliance's role of "building" rather than its traditional role of "safeguarding," Euro-American freedom, the NSS signals
US expectations that NATO is to take a more active and nontraditional role in European affairs. The use of NATO
enlargement to promote democracy, political stability, and economic development is turning NATO away from its
collective defense role and using Alliance enlargement policy as a form of geopolitical social work.[13] By using
NATO enlargement to spread democracy, stability, and prosperity throughout Europe rather than as the means for
providing its members collective defense, the Administration confuses the benefits of NATO with its purpose.[14] This
may appear to be an artificial distinction in those situations where NATO expansion enhances European stability while
promoting the Alliance's collective defense mission; however, it becomes a critical distinction when enlargement
results in a reduction of the Alliance's ability to protect its members. It is this conflict of ends that makes the issue
regarding Baltic membership in NATO so complex. While Baltic membership in NATO may help spread democracy
and prosperity to those nations, it will seriously undermine the Alliance's ability to perform its Article 5 mission. These
divergent results and the uncertainty of US policy regarding NATO enlargement become even more evident when US
Baltic policy is considered.
US Baltic Policy
Before the end of the Cold War, the Baltic region of Northeastern Europe was an area of little political action or
interest for the United States. Although the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union's claims of sovereignty
over the Baltic republics, America never seriously challenged Soviet interests or influence over the region. However,
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Northeastern Europe has become an area of significant American interest
where three critical areas of US regional policy (Russia, the Baltics, and the Nordic regions) intersect.[15] Recognizing
the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War and Baltic independence, the United States has worked to
strengthen Baltic integration with the West while lessening Russian influence in the region. A politically significant
first step occurred when the US Department of State created the Office of Nordic and Baltic Affairs and placed it
under the control of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. This change sent a clear and resolute signal to
Russia that the United States considered the Baltic republics an integral part of Europe and no longer within Russia's
sphere of influence.[16]

Seeking to improve bilateral relations between the United States and the Baltic republics, and to encourage political,
economic, and security cooperation, the State Department presented a "Baltic Action Plan" in the autumn of 1996. The
plan consisted of three tracks designed to integrate the Baltic republics into the West.[17] The first track seeks to
strengthen Baltic sovereignty and promote internal reforms by integrating the three republics into European and EuroAtlantic institutions. The second track promotes the use of bilateral and multilateral efforts to encourage the
development of good relations with Russia. And the third track addresses American efforts to demonstrate our
commitment to the Baltic republics and to promote political, social, and economic development within those
states.[18]
Following the "first round" of enlargement talks at the Madrid Summit in 1997, the United States took another step in
addressing the security concerns of the Baltic republics. The Charter of Partnership (Baltic Charter), signed in January
1998 by the United States and the republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, built on the Baltic Action Plan. While
the Baltic Charter did not specifically provide a US guarantee of Baltic security or NATO membership, it did confirm
the Baltic republics' inherent right to choose their own security arrangements. It also declared that the ultimate goal of
the signatories was to incorporate the Baltics into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defense
institutions. Although the Baltic Charter did not specifically guarantee that the Baltic republics would become
members of NATO, Clinton Administration statements left little doubt that the United States was committed to helping
create the conditions for Baltic membership within NATO's ongoing enlargement process.[19]
Administration support for Baltic membership in NATO was confirmed during the Baltic Charter signing ceremony
when President Clinton declared, "America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and
Latvia can one day walk through [NATO's] door."[20] Deputy US Secretary of State Strobe Talbott provided a more
recent statement of support for Baltic republic membership during the Washington Summit in April 1999 when he
declared that although continued NATO expansion is not inevitable, Baltic membership in the Alliance is desirable,
and the Baltic republics should be confident of future admission.[21] The Administration's message is clear: the United
States supports Baltic membership in NATO.
Unfortunately, that message is also unsound, because every endorsement of Baltic membership in NATO takes the
United States farther away from being able to effectively implement the sensible and measured policies contained in
the Baltic Action Plan, it gives the Baltic republics false security hopes, and it unnecessarily alienates Russia.
Notwithstanding the Administration's support for Baltic republic membership in NATO, those nations are not yet ready
for NATO membership, and neither the United States nor NATO has a vital interest there or the military means to
protect the Baltic republics.
Russian Perceptions and Reactions
Many Russian leaders perceive that NATO is taking advantage of their country during its difficult transition from
communism to democracy and a market economy. They view the eastward expansion of the Alliance as a direct threat
to Russian security, and Russians of all political backgrounds are implacably opposed to NATO membership for the
Baltic republics.[22]
Russian opposition regarding any expansion of NATO into the Baltic republics should come as no surprise.
Historically, a fundamental objective of Russian national strategy has been to ensure that a buffer of weak nations,
held firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, protected their frontiers.[23] The creation and maintenance of this
protective shield has consistently remained a vital Russian interest throughout the past century. Even with the end of
the Cold War and the voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe, it is doubtful that Russia expected
to lose this buffer. However, Russian plans to replace the Warsaw Pact with a shield of neutral or nonaligned nations
held within their sphere of influence failed to develop when those nations began to look to the West for protection.[24]
Thus, instead of having the Baltic republics serve as a buffer between Russia and the West, NATO's expansion into the
region has threatened to place a militarily united Europe at Russia's border. Russians see this prospect as the realization
of their worst security nightmare. However, Russia's concerns are not solely caused by NATO's eastward expansion;
they are also the result of NATO's evolving "out of area" operations within Europe.
NATO's survival after the end of the Cold War is due in part to the Alliance's evolution that expanded its mission from

one of collective defense to missions that are increasingly responsible for maintaining peace and stability in Europe. In
conducting "out of area" peace operations, NATO has assumed offensive objectives in addition to its traditional
collective defense mission.[25] These more offensive-oriented operations, particularly when conducted in areas of
Europe formerly under the control of the Warsaw Pact, reinforce Russian perceptions that NATO intends to interfere in
their national internal affairs and those of their "allies." NATO's new missions, when combined with its eastward
expansion, are also viewed by Russia as a betrayal of Western assurances, given during the German unification
negotiations, that NATO would not "move to the east by a single inch, and not a single Warsaw Pact country will be
admitted to NATO."[26]
Although Russia was not able to prevent NATO enlargement into the Visegrad, its leaders have informed the West
with unmistakable clarity that they view Baltic membership in NATO as a "red line"[27] that should not be crossed
and will consider any NATO expansion into that region as a direct threat to Russia's vital national interests. The "first
round" of NATO enlargement has already resulted in a hardening of Russian attitudes and an increasing movement to
block US and NATO policies and programs in Europe. Any NATO movement into the Baltic region is likely to
aggravate those attitudes and create an irreconcilably suspicious and hostile atmosphere between Russia and the West-one that could result in a Russian return to Cold War postures and policies. And, unless Russian leaders receive what
they perceive is an appropriate response to their concerns regarding NATO expansion and operations, they will resist
what they believe is a Western attempt to marginalize Russia's role in Europe.
Baltic Failure to Meet NATO Admission Guidelines
Russian opposition to Baltic membership in NATO is a major factor in the Alliance's reluctance to access the Baltic
republics; however, it is not the only reason. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's assessment regarding the
Baltic states' suitability for NATO accession made in 1996 remains equally valid today: "The Baltic states are not
ready to join NATO. These countries simply do not meet the alliance's standards."[28] The Baltic republics have not
created the conditions necessary to achieve the political and military criteria that the "Study on NATO Enlargement"
established as a guide for accessing new members.
The accession guidelines creating the greatest obstacle to NATO membership for the Baltic states are those that require
prospective members to have resolved ethnic or external territorial disputes and be capable of contributing to the
Alliance's collective defense. While not all of the Baltic states have failed to achieve adequate standards for every
condition, all have failed to meet accession standards in at least one of the territorial, ethnic, or military guidelines
established for membership.
Territorial Disputes
The "Study on NATO Enlargement" requires prospective members of the alliance to have "demonstrated a
commitment to . . . the resolution of . . . external territorial disputes . . . by peaceful means."[29] This is a sound policy
when adding new members to an alliance that has as its fundamental purpose the preservation of the peace and security
of its members through collective defense. While NATO is understandably reluctant to add any member with an
existing border dispute, this issue becomes even more sensitive with the Baltic states because their border disputes
involve Russia.
Lithuania is the only Baltic republic that has signed a border treaty with Russia. The disputes involving Russia's
borders with Estonia and Latvia are still unresolved for two reasons. First, unlike Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are
seeking to reestablish the borders that existed prior to their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. Second, Russia,
knowing of NATO's accession policies, has delayed reaching a border agreement to force Estonia and Latvia to adopt
more favorable citizenship policies for Russian minorities within those countries. Realizing Russia's tactic to keep
Estonia and Latvia out of NATO by prolonging negotiations, it is debatable whether NATO members would deny
those nations admission solely for that reason. The more challenging issue to NATO would be whether to admit a
member with such a large and volatile number of ethnic Russian "non-citizens" as both Estonia and Latvia now
possess.[30]
Ethnic Unrest

The Alliance also expects that prospective members demonstrate a clear commitment to resolving ethnic disputes
within their countries. This is not an issue in Lithuania because of its relatively small ethnically Russian
population.[31] Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for either Estonia or Latvia, which have ethnically Russian
populations of 30 and 34 percent, respectively.[32] Many Estonians and Latvians see their Russian neighbors as
colonizers whose loyalties are uncertain and whose presence in such large numbers threatens the political security and
ethnic identity of their nations. As a result, both countries adopted policies granting automatic citizenship to very few
of their ethnic Russian residents and making the naturalization process lengthy and difficult.[33] These and similar
policies have caused a great deal of resentment among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia and have prompted
Russia to exert pressure on those nations in an attempt to gain more favorable treatment for those minorities.[34]
Western efforts to temper Estonian and Latvian policies regarding the treatment of their Russian minorities have been
only moderately effective. Significant work must be done before the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia are truly
integrated into the fabric of Baltic society in those nations. Although some proponents of immediate Baltic
membership in NATO contend that the problem can be solved after admission, the resolution of this issue is essential
to the internal stability of those states and must be addressed before NATO accession occurs. The Baltic republics
must be internally stable before they can be allowed into NATO. However, they will never achieve internal stability if
they contain a large, alienated, and embittered Russian minority.[35]
Military Capability
A key criterion for NATO membership "is the capability of each member state to come to the defense" and aid of the
other Alliance members as provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.[36] This should come as no surprise to any
nation seeking to join an alliance whose fundamental purpose is to provide security for its members through collective
defense. Unfortunately, none of the Baltic republics currently possesses a credible military force capable of adequately
defending its own territory or of effectively contributing to NATO's collective defense. The Baltic republics would be
security recipients rather than mutual security providers as NATO partners.
The Baltic republics are struggling to establish capable, reliable armed forces. Their task is daunting. The combined
strength of the armed forces in the Baltic republics is fewer than 18,000 members, and the Russians left little usable
equipment or infrastructure when they withdrew from the region, having wrecked what they could not remove.[37]
Although most Western governments have assisted the Baltic armies by providing them with training, small arms, and
light vehicles, they have not been willing to provide the Baltic states with the items essential to defend against a
Russian invasion: anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.[38]
The Baltic republics have sought to demonstrate their commitment to NATO membership by ensuring that adequate
resources are dedicated to defense. Although each nation set a goal of increasing defense expenditures to two percent
of its gross national product (GNP), none has reached that level of spending. Lithuania's defense budget was 1.45
percent of its GNP in 1998, with the Lithuanian State Defense Committee recommending that it be raised to two
percent in 2000. Estonia's defense budget has fallen sharply from 1996 levels (far short of two percent of GNP), and
Latvia's defense forces are critically underfunded, with spending at a level barely adequate to maintain its present poor
defense posture.[39] Baltic difficulty in reaching the two percent spending target does not indicate a lack of
commitment. Rather it reflects the economic difficulties associated with the transition of these countries from
communism to a free-market economy and the pressing social needs that compete with defense spending for scarce
government funds.
Proponents of Baltic accession point to the combined Nordic-Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) as evidence of the Baltic
states' defense capability and readiness to join NATO. Unfortunately, their confidence in this manifestation of
multinational military cooperation is overstated. Although the Nordic-Baltic Battalion is effective in conducting peace
operations, it is not designed to assume a defense mission in the Baltics, and in that role it is militarily useless.[40]
That is because there is little connection between the peacekeeping mission of the battalion and the defense mission of
the remaining armed forces in each of the Baltic states.[41] Thus, the combined battalion creates a false impression
that the Baltic armed forces have achieved a greater defense capability than they actually possess. The battalion is also
costly. For example, Estonia spends more than ten percent of its annual budget to support only 412 peacekeepers,
including those assigned to the combined battalion.[42] The result of Baltic efforts to field forces capable of operating

with NATO in peace operations may actually be harming Baltic defense capability and development. The consequence
of Baltic efforts to support NATO peace operations is the creation of a two-tier armed forces within the Baltic
republics, one designed to engage in peace operations, and the other for national defense, with neither able to function
well as a whole. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Baltic republics do not now possess a credible military
capability worthy of NATO membership, and it is doubtful that they have the capacity to build one in the foreseeable
future.
Baltic Membership in NATO: US Interests
In their ardor to use NATO as a means to promote the spread of democracy and free-market economies throughout
Europe, US policymakers are ignoring the fundamental purpose of the Alliance. In a speech made prior to the Madrid
Summit in 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared, "We must pledge that the first members will not be
the last and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map."[43] This policy may
appeal to our hearts, but it should not appeal to our heads. Despite Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's contention that
the end of the Cold War allows us to put aside "military and geopolitical considerations" and allow "other nonmilitary
goals . . . to shape the new NATO,"[44] geography and geopolitics still matter when inviting new members into the
Alliance.
Article 5 of the NATO Charter should serve as a clear reminder that NATO is not a club but a military alliance. In the
Administration's efforts to convince us that we must expand NATO to create a new Europe without lines, it forgets that
military alliances are all about lines--lines that separate the territory that alliance members are sworn to defend from
those areas that the members have no obligation to defend.[45] The United States should not incur an obligation to
defend the Baltic republics; we have neither a vital interest in those nations, nor the military means to effectively
defend them.
Defining US Interests in the Baltics
The NSS defines as "vital" those interests of "broad and overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of
our nation."[46] Vital interests are of such importance to our national well-being that we will defend them, when
necessary, with unilateral and decisive military force. Through our membership in NATO, the United States has
declared that the territorial security of the member nations is a vital US national interest, an interest that we are
committed under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to defend by military means. However, although the NSS declares
that European stability is vital to our security,[47] we should recognize that not every part of Europe is of equal
significance to the United States or to the advancement of our national interests.
Many Americans acknowledge that Western Europe is vital to US security and an area that should be protected by
explicit security guarantees. Few Americans, however, will agree that the Baltic states constitute an area that is vital to
US strategic interests. Even fewer Americans are likely to be willing to use military force to defend the Baltic
republics against Russian aggression. Proponents of Baltic membership in NATO contend that Russia is incapable of
resorting to a military response due to its present state of decline. However, such grave risks, even if unlikely, should
never be incurred except to defend vital US interests.[48] And while neither the United States nor our NATO allies
possess vital interests in the Baltic republics, Russia does, and has declared that it will act to protect them.
Russia's concept of national security states, "The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable to Russia
since it represents a threat to its national security."[49] Russia has clearly signaled that Baltic accession to NATO
could lead to serious consequences. If one of the consequences of Baltic accession into NATO is a Russian invasion of
the Baltic republics, NATO could find itself committed to protect an area that it has neither the desire nor the ability to
effectively defend.
Baltic Defensibility
NATO is first and foremost a military compact designed to protect its members from armed aggression. Extending
membership and its concomitant security guarantees to the Baltic states would send the clear message that NATO is no
longer a serious military alliance.[50] Geography, the Baltic republics' lack of significant military capability, and the
proximity of Russian military power[51] underscore NATO's difficulty in providing a security guarantee to the Baltic

republics and cause most Western military experts to believe that the region cannot be defended by conventional
NATO forces.[52]
Proponents of Baltic accession contend that although the Baltic states may be incapable of preventing a Russian
invasion, they could attempt to buy time until reinforcements from NATO could arrive by improving their armies and
acting in concert.[53] Unfortunately, Baltic military experts estimate that they could maintain only four days of active
defense in the event of an attack from Russia,[54] far too little time for significant and effective NATO reinforcement.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that the nearest usable NATO forces are stationed in western Germany,
more than 700 miles away. In addition, NATO currently has only minimal power-projection capability, and depends
heavily on the United States for airlift capability.[55]
Proponents also contend that although the Baltic states may not be defensible, they can nonetheless be "protected" by
their inclusion under NATO's defense umbrella. As an example, they point to NATO's preservation of freedom in West
Berlin and Copenhagen, both cities claimed to be as indefensible as the Baltic states.[56] It is true that NATO likely
deterred Russia from taking military action against those cities, but enlargement proponents fail to recognize that the
Russians possessed no vital interest in those cities. The Russians do possess and have clearly announced their vital
security interest in the Baltic region. Accordingly, it is doubtful that any amount of NATO protection that lacks a
credible military foundation will be adequate to deter Russia from using whatever means necessary to preserve those
interests.
NATO should admit members only when they can be credibly defended by the Alliance and when accession will
benefit the Alliance. Baltic state membership would accomplish neither. Instead, it would weaken the Alliance, alienate
Russia, and provide the Baltic states with a false sense of security--results that could be a prelude to calamity.
A Proposed US Baltic Policy
A review of US Baltic policy yields a contradictory and unclear picture. Although the Baltic Action Plan provided the
United States with a sound and measured policy, the Baltic Charter and the frequent public statements made by senior
members of the Clinton Administration have left the goals of US Baltic policy in a state of uncertainty. That
uncertainty is harmful because it gives the Baltic nations an expectation of imminent NATO membership, fuels
Russian anxieties and hostility, and confuses our NATO allies. The United States should resolve this uncertainty by
adopting, in consultation with our NATO allies, a sound and unambiguous policy regarding the Baltic republics.
The United States should adopt an expanded Baltic/NATO policy that has as its core the objectives of the Baltic
Action Plan. The objectives of an expanded Baltic policy should be to:
Assist the Baltic republics in establishing closer ties with Western Europe.
Encourage and facilitate improved relations between the Baltic states and Russia.
Improve US-Russian relations and increase US assistance to northwestern Russia.
Establish conditions for NATO membership based on strategic and geopolitical criteria.
Baltic Integration with Western Europe
Instead of advocating Baltic membership in NATO, the next US Administration should assist the Baltic republics in
establishing ties to the West through membership in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC), the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
and the European Union (EU). In particular, the Administration should work with the EU to develop a "fast track"
association for the Baltic states. The negligible economic impact that the Baltic republics would have on the EU should
allow that organization to provide the republics with a more rapid integration into the union than their economic
condition would otherwise permit. Although EU membership will not provide the Baltic republics with the same hard
security guarantees as would NATO membership, "in itself, EU membership and economic cooperation is an important
security guarantee since any Russian intervention--or threat of intervention--in an EU member state would have
serious consequences for its relations with Europe as a whole."[57] And, because most Russian leaders view the EU as
a tool of economic rather than military cooperation, they do not oppose Baltic state membership in that
organization.[58]

Proponents of NATO membership for the Baltic states claim that efforts to obtain "fast track" membership in the EU is
unlikely to result because the EU will not act until NATO takes the lead.[59] If that is so, it is better that we discover
that lack of resolve before we attempt to provide the Baltic republics with the security of NATO membership. For if
the members of the EU are unwilling to provide the Baltic states with the "soft security" and economic benefits that
result from EU membership, how can anyone believe that many of the same nations would be willing to protect the
Baltic republics with the military guarantees provided by NATO membership?
Improved Baltic-Russian Relations
Baltic security also can be enhanced through US encouragement and support of programs that help to improve BalticRussian relations and draw Russia into closer cooperation with its Baltic and Nordic neighbors. US efforts to promote
improved Baltic-Russian relations should focus on four major objectives:
Encourage Estonia and Latvia to resolve their border disputes with Russia and to integrate their Russian
minorities more fully into their nations' political and social communities.
Enhance regional cooperation by promoting Baltic republic, Russian, and Nordic participation in regional and
international organizations (PfP, Membership Action Plan, EAPC, Council of Baltic Sea States, Euro-Arctic
Barents Regional Forum) that will engage Russia in pan-Baltic political, economic, and security processes.
Provide additional resources to the Baltic nations to encourage regional cooperation between the Baltic states
and Russia in the areas of crime prevention, energy use, commercial cooperation, and education to help the
Baltic republics focus on the integration of their Russian minorities into the social and political fabric of their
countries.[60]
Encourage the Nordic states to continue to provide economic, political, and military assistance to the Baltic
republics.
US-Russian Relations
The Administration should continue to undertake economic, political, and military efforts to promote improved USRussian relations and to encourage Russia to continue its integration into the European community of democratic
nations.
Although it is doubtful that improved US-Russian relations will make Baltic republic membership in NATO any more
acceptable to Russia, it would be beneficial in two substantial ways. First, it might reduce Russian anxiety regarding
the United States and our NATO allies and lessen the likelihood of a hostile Russian reaction to the integration of the
Baltic republics into Western Europe's non-NATO organizations. Second, the more completely Russia is integrated
into the international community and is made a partner in the development of a new European security architecture, the
greater its stake will be in preserving regional stability and the easier it will be for the West to calm Russian fears
about NATO's role in Europe.
US Policy Regarding NATO Enlargement
The United States needs to lead NATO members in a serious consideration of the Alliance's strategic mission and the
end state sought by continued enlargement. Although the "Alliance's Strategic Concept" and the "Study on NATO
Enlargement" define the purpose and principles of enlargement and confirm the organization's fundamental mission,
they fail to answer the more challenging and contentious issues facing the members: What is the ultimate end state of
enlargement, and how will the members know when that goal has been achieved? How fast should NATO enlargement
take place, and how far should it go?
NATO has declared that it has an "open door" to aspiring members. However, the Alliance should also clearly state
that the decision to invite new members will be based on NATO's strategic interests, the qualifications of prospective
entrants, and NATO's perception of threats to European security and stability. NATO must make it clear that it intends
to remain a serious military alliance[61] and that enlargement will be a deliberate process undertaken based on the
needs of the organization, the capabilities of prospective members, and with regard for a fearful and dangerous Russia.

The United States should also encourage NATO to undergo a considerable pause before accepting any new members.
A lengthy pause (of approximately ten years) would allow NATO to more completely incorporate Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic into the Alliance and assess the likely effects of continued enlargement on the
organization.[62] It also would give Russia time to grow accustomed to an enlarged NATO and to adjust to the new
political and strategic realities in Europe. Although some enlargement proponents contend that a delay in NATO's
expansion is nothing more than an "apausement"[63] to Russia's threatening, it is a politically difficult[64] yet
absolutely necessary step that should be taken.
Conclusion
It is imperative that US policymakers establish a clear Baltic strategy that places US interests at its foundation.
Although the Clinton Administration made a good beginning with the adoption of the Baltic Action Plan, subsequent
statements and policies have left US objectives regarding the Baltic republics in a state of uncertainty. That uncertainty
is harmful because it has created an unrealistic sense of expectation for the Baltic republics, unnecessary anxiety for
Russia, and confusion among our NATO allies. It is a self-imposed policy weakness that we can and should correct
now. By using the Baltic Action Plan as a focal point, the United States should act to encourage improved BalticRussian relations and work in conjunction with our NATO allies to establish a long-term Alliance strategy and
conditions for membership based solely on NATO's strategic and geopolitical needs.
Implementing this strategy will not be easy. The strategy proposed here does not correspond to the desires and goals of
the Baltic republics or to the promises made to them by the Clinton Administration. However, the Baltic nations are
good students of their national self-interest, and they should not expect otherwise from the United States. The realities
of the ancients remain equally valid today--the strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what
they have to accept.[65] Notwithstanding our promises and hopes that the Baltic republics may someday become
NATO members, today is not the day, nor should that day come soon. The Baltic republics are simply not ready to
become NATO members, and even if they were, NATO is not yet ready for them.
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